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INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Jefferson dreamt of an agrarian republic for his newly 
liberated country.1  He envisioned a nation populated with small, 
independent farmers, each cultivating the land to provide just enough 
sustenance for economic self-sufficiency.2  Jefferson said, 
“Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ 
of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.”3  For 
Jefferson, the city epitomized this vitriolic view of dependence.4  He 
wrote, “The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of 
pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body.”5  
Jefferson believed urban living was detrimental to the health of 
society and preferred other forms of settlement.6 
Consequently, this anti-urban rhetoric became encoded in early 
national opinion and strategy.7  For example, while in the Continental 
Congress, Jefferson authored the Land Ordinance of 1785 (the 
Ordinance).8  Among other things, the Ordinance established a 
system of surveying the land west of the Appalachian Mountains and 
east of the Mississippi River to create ten new states.9  The sale of that 
                                                                                                                             
 1. See Matthew O’Brien, Are the Suburbs Where the American Dream Goes to 
Die?, ATLANTIC (Jul. 23, 2013, 6:42 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2013/07/are-the-suburbs-where-the-american-dream-goes-to-die/278014/. 
 2. See Harry W. Fritz, The Agrarian, DISCOVERING LEWIS & CLARK, 
http://lewis-clark.org/content/content-article.asp?ArticleID=1749 (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Leonardo Vazquez, Thomas Jefferson: The Founding Father of Sprawl, 
PLANETIZEN (Feb. 20, 2006, 7:00 AM), http://www.planetizen.com/node/18841. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Va., Land Ordinance of 1785 (May 20, 1785), available at 
http://research.archives.gov/description/1943531. 
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land provided a revenue stream to pay the debts of the American 
Revolution.10  The Ordinance initiated a rectangular system for 
dividing the land within six-mile square townships.11  Each square was 
divided thirty-six times into 640-acre sections.12  Of the total sections, 
one section was reserved for public education, and thirty-five were 
offered for sale to the public at one dollar per acre.13  This 
arrangement would lay the foundation of American land policy for 
the next century.14  Although the Ordinance did not mention anti-
urban policies, it clearly discouraged urban growth by providing a 
system for people to literally sprawl across large plots of land.15  
Through his political vision and actions, Jefferson linked the future of 
American development to what we classify today as suburban 
sprawl.16 
Not coincidentally, over the last one hundred years, American land 
use policy has embodied Jefferson’s sprawl philosophy.  Regulations 
were designed to segregate uses of land, reduce population density, 
and facilitate the use of automobiles.17  Residential areas became 
segregated from commercial developments, and neighborhoods were 
thinly spread across vast tracts of open land.18  Originally hailed as a 
solution to the “evils of city life,” suburban sprawl has come to 
represent the American dream, where citizens can own a home, two-
car garage, both back and front yards, and if you are truly lucky, a 
pool.19  
Unfortunately, suburban sprawl has also had regrettable side 
effects.  Critics of sprawl claim that it causes a splintered and 
segregated development of society, which leads to social and 
economic inequalities.20  Additionally, sprawl displaces agrarian and 
natural spaces while emptying American cities of their populations 
                                                                                                                             
 10. See id. 
 11. Scott D. Warner, Land Ordinance of 1785, LAND SURVEYORS UNITED (May 
11, 2011, 10:36 PM), http://landsurveyorsunited.com/group/historyandsurveyingusa/ 
forum/topics/land-ordinance-of-1785. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Va., Land Ordinance of 1785. 
 15. See Vazquez, supra note 6. 
 16. See generally id. 
 17. See generally Michael Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for Dummies, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 257 (2006). 
 18. See id. at 257. 
 19. JOEL KOTKIN, REASON PUB. POL’Y INST., OLDER SUBURBS: CRABGRASS 
SLUMS OR NEW URBAN FRONTIER 1 (2001). 
 20. See PETER CALTHORPE & WILLIAM FULTON, THE REGIONAL CITY 11 (2001). 
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and resources.21  Additionally, as more space on the outskirts of 
development is consumed, people must travel further to their 
workplace and to places of commerce.  Accordingly, suburbanites 
spend more time in their personal automobiles and less time 
interacting with one another,22 which can have a deteriorating effect 
on American communities.23 
Recently, however, greater metropolitan areas that include 
suburban enclaves have grown more dense as people move back 
towards the city center.24  “Over the past 60 years, the urbanized areas 
of the planet have gone from 29 percent in 1950, to half of the world’s 
population today, and by 2050, 70 percent of the world’s population is 
expected to live in urban regions.”25  Similarly, reflecting these trends, 
in the United States the suburban metropolis contains more than half 
of its citizens, compared with roughly twenty-three percent in 1950.26  
In fact, according to the 2000 census, one third of all Americans live 
in twenty of the largest metropolitan areas.27 Some predict that by 
2050, ninety percent of the United States population will live in 
cities.28   
These metropolitan areas have also emerged as single, cohesive 
economic units that compete in the world economy.29  This 
phenomenon has made economic interdependence of the smaller 
municipalities within the metropolitan area a reality.30  Problems of 
                                                                                                                             
 21. See id. at 12. 
 22. See Jeremy Meredith, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 89 VA. L. REV. 
447, 448 (2003). 
 23. The consequences of sprawl have been most detrimental to the “environment, 
health and quality of life.”  BASUDEB BHATTA, ANALYSIS OF URBAN GROWTH AND 
SPRAWL FROM REMOTE SENSING DATA 29 (2010).  A study by Smart Growth of 
eighty-three metropolitan areas concludes that “[e]ven when controlling for income, 
household size, and other variables, people drive more, have to own more cars, 
breathe more polluted air, face greater risk of traffic fatalities, and walk and use 
transit less in places with more sprawling development patterns.” Reid Ewing, et al., 
Measuring Sprawl and Its Impact 47 (Smart Growth America, Working Paper vol. I, 
2002), available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/MeasuringSprawl 
Technical.pdf. 
 24. See Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital and 
Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 535 (2006). 
 25. Peter Steinbrueck, Urbanism Needs to Move Beyond City Boundaries, 
CROSSCUT (Sept. 3, 2011), http://crosscut.com/2011/09/03/urban/21265/Urbanism-
needs-move-beyond-city-boundaries. 
 26. See Kotkin, supra note 19, at 5. 
 27. See CALTHORPE & FULTON, supra note 20, at 15. 
 28. See Steinbrueck, supra note 25. 
 29. See id. at 15–16. 
 30. See id. at 21. 
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the typical “inner city” were previously seen as independent from the 
suburbs, but it is now necessary to examine these issues from a 
regional perspective.31  Even if a person lives and works in a single 
municipality, his economic and ecological footprints reverberate 
throughout the region.32 
As urbanization develops, its patterns of growth follow the path of 
least resistance.33  For instance, urban revitalization offers developers 
an opportunity to reclaim previously abandoned lots.34  Reclamation 
of individual lots creates the possibility for disorganized development 
with little potential to be “stable, self-sustaining, and self-renewing.”35  
Additionally, empty lots have become integrated into the 
communities of the inner city by utilizing them as parks and gardens.36  
As these types of places are consumed by economic demand, inner 
cities run the risk of losing their sense of community.  This potential 
consequence of urbanization, coupled with sporadic patterns of 
development, presents a risk to stability.  Therefore, it is imperative 
that the redevelopment of inner cities occurs under a conscious plan 
to retain the culture of the inner city, while addressing some of the 
traditional downsides of the urban environment. 
As a result of sprawl’s negative consequences along with the 
trending return to city living, a few urban planners met in the 1990s to 
rethink traditional zoning codes.37  One possible remedy that emerged 
was “new urbanism,” and the Congress for New Urbanism.38  Instilled 
with the principles of restoring the walkability of the urban landscape, 
revitalizing communities through the diversification of land uses and 
social interactions, and preserving the natural and national legacy of 
America, new urbanism aims to restore the once vital and influential 
city center.39  To sustain these principles, new urbanists intend to 
create a coherent and supportive physical framework.40  However, this 
concept does not attempt to replicate the blueprints of past 
                                                                                                                             
 31. See id. at 28. 
 32. See Steinbrueck, supra note 25. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Foster, supra note 24, at 535. 
 35. See Steinbrueck, supra note 25. 
 36. See Foster, supra note 24, at 534–35. 
 37. See Janna Blasingame Custer, New Urbanism and Euclidian Zoning: Can 
They Co-Exist?, LAND USE CLINIC, Apr. 1, 2007, at 2. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Charter of the New Urbanism, CONGRESS FOR NEW URBANISM, 
http://www.cnu.org/charter (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
 40. See id. 
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development styles.41  Rather, new urbanists plan and design using 
traditional community principles, such as individual home ownership, 
shared common spaces, and small localized businesses, while also 
integrating modern technology and amenities.42  The approach 
attempts to address the social and economic deterioration of the 
American urban landscape through precise planning and 
development.43 
A major challenge for new urbanism, however, is that planners are 
dependent on municipal actors who implement localized land use 
regimes.44  Traditionally, municipalities have relied on the land use 
concept known as “Euclidean zoning.”45  Euclidean zoning segregates 
uses by area, such as residential from commercial, and both from 
industrial.46  Euclidian zoning regulation is also associated with the 
expansion of sprawl.47  Even though many local planners and public 
officials may not advocate for sprawl, controlling governments using 
Euclidean principles continue to approve sprawl-related projects, and 
thus perpetuate the defective structure.48  However, new urbanism 
depends on integrating uses and the flexibility to work around 
Euclidean boundaries.49  New urbanist planners will have to evolve 
their municipalities’ land use regimes. 
Local municipalities control their land use regulations, and have 
the ability to amend or modify the ordinances and processes used.50  
Even with this flexibility, local land use planners have not created 
systems for the successful implementation of new urbanism, and it has 
                                                                                                                             
 41. See Custer, supra note 37, at 2.  Older development styles include a defined 
city center where most of the buildings were within a five-minute walk to the center. 
See id.  The dwellings varied in style and function so the community could be 
inhabited by younger and older, rich and poor. See id.  There were small playgrounds 
within the neighborhood and elementary schools were within walking distance of 
students’ homes. See id.  After driving along narrow streets that specifically restricted 
speedy traffic, automobile users were forced to park in the rear of buildings. See id. at 
3.  The neighborhood was laid out using interconnected streets offering numerous 
traffic options; civic buildings stood at the end of prominent streets. See id. 
 42. See id. at 2–3. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 3. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Peter Katz, New Urbanism at 20: A Critical Assessment, BETTER! CITIES 
& TOWNS (May 23, 2013), http://bettercities.net/news-opinion/blogs/peter-
katz/20202/new-urbanism-20-critical-assessment. 
 49. See Custer, supra note 37, at 3. 
 50. See id. 
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failed to become a dominant land use form.51  Some argue that local 
municipalities’ failure to implement new urbanism lies in market 
force manipulation like developer pressures or even individual 
suspicion and backlash from citizens.52  Others argue that the failure 
lies in the local governments’ inability to establish a policy framework 
that supports the underlying principles.53  A third argument focuses 
on the patchwork implementation of new urbanism and lack of 
connection between new developments and surrounding areas.54 
This Note asks whether our attachment to “localism” restricts new 
urbanism from satisfying its objectives.  Localism is the concept of 
legal and political empowerment of autonomous municipalities, as a 
response to the idea that regional or state influences undermine that 
autonomy during their decision-making processes.55  During the 
previous American migration from cities to the suburbs, individuals 
sought control over the development of their new communities,56 and 
coupled with the evolution of state law towards easier municipal 
incorporation, the existence of local governments exploded.57  The 
strength of the localism ideology is exemplified by the upward trend 
in municipal creation.  In 1942, there were approximately 24,500 
municipalities and special districts in the United States, and by 1992, 
that number had more than doubled to 50,834.58  This growth resulted 
in an average of 113 local governments per metropolitan area.59 
Given this autonomy, municipalities deal with many challenges.  
Some issues facing metropolitan areas—like general economic 
decline, sprawl, and social inequality—extend beyond the limits of 
individual municipal borders, so the logical assumption would be to 
address them through locality coordination.60  “Certain challenges can 
be addressed more effectively at a regional scale because individual 
local governments lack the capacity or resources to address certain 
                                                                                                                             
 51. See Chris DeWolf, Why New Urbanism Fails, PLANETIZEN (Feb. 18, 2002, 
12:00 AM), http://www.planetizen.com/node/42. 
 52. See Custer, supra note 37, at 3–4. 
 53. See Katz, supra note 48. 
 54. See DeWolf, supra note 51. 
 55. See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) 
[hereinafter Briffault, Localism and Regionalism]. 
 56. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the 
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 
1992 (2000). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See CALTHORPE & FULTON, supra note 20, at 32. 
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issues without the cooperation of neighboring jurisdictions.”61  
However, as Professor Richard Briffault of Columbia Law School 
points out in such crucial areas as “growth management, exclusionary 
zoning, and tax base equity,” regional initiatives are absent.62  
Coordinating and consolidating local power into a regional form of 
governance can fill this need.63 
Localities are acutely aware that they are semi-dependent and do 
participate in some intra-regional cooperation.64  Examples of this 
include shared utility and water districts.65  But Clayton Gillette, a 
professor at New York University School of Law, argues that 
localities only participate in these bargains if regional benefits are 
obvious, burdens are shared, and costs are monitored to prevent 
freeloading.66  Additionally, the fear of redistributional consequences 
and the migration of mobile individuals to different regions limit 
intraregional deals.67  Therefore, the self-interest of local governments 
and the risks involved in cooperation ultimately blinds these actors to 
the potential benefits of regional collaboration.68 
Localism’s collective action problem creates a prisoner’s dilemma 
scenario in which neighboring localities fail to see the benefits of a 
healthy vibrant city center and focus instead on the burdens and costs 
associated with creating a regional system.69  This ultimately creates a 
patchwork plan of improved development that is segregated from 
bordering preexisting styles with little infrastructure bridging the two 
areas.70  To be successful, a region must be viewed as a single 
                                                                                                                             
 61. LINDA MCCARTHY, COMPETITIVE REGIONALISM: BEYOND INDIVIDUAL 
COMPETITION, 4 (2000), available at http://localgov.fsu.edu/readings_papers/ 
regional%20governance/McCarthy_competitive_regionalism.pdf?p3216634. 
 62. Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 55, at 26. 
 63. See Steinbrueck, supra note 25. 
 64. See Cashin, supra note 56, at 2030–31 (“Transportation, waste treatment and 
disposal, and signature facilities for recreation, culture, sports, or convention centers 
most likely engender interlocal cooperation because most citizens and localities 
perceive them as a benefit—or a necessity—that they can enjoy, with little threat of 
loss due to zero-sum competition.”). 
 65. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 431 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part II.] 
 66. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 190 (2001). 
 67. See id. at 251. 
 68. See Cashin, supra note 56, at 2033. 
 69. See id. at 1988. 
 70. See DeWolf, supra note 51. 
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interconnected unit made up of many smaller communities, each 
playing an important role in the overall health of the region.71 
The power of localism is evident in the failure of new urbanism.  
Most Americans spend each day moving throughout multiple 
localities within an invisible regional city system.72  As Peter 
Calthorpe and William Fulton write, “We live in an aggregation of 
cities and suburbs: a metropolitan community that forms one 
economic, cultural, environmental, and civic entity.”73  New urbanism 
depends on the successful interconnection of multiple localities to 
generate social and economic resource streams into and through the 
city center.  Currently, independent local governments endeavor to 
create new urbanist communities, and although they may succeed in 
transforming a neighborhood, the ultimate goal of a thriving, 
widespread community is rarely achieved.74  The fear of absorbing 
externalities, and dealing with the consequences of that scenario, 
creates a strong rationale for self-interest and seclusion.75  This Note 
hypothesizes that the failure of new urbanism lies in its inability to 
break free from localism’s isolationist tendencies and integrate these 
new urbanist developments into the surrounding region. 
One method for successfully implementing new urbanism is 
through regional governance structures, but state governments have 
often faced harsh criticism for interference in local autonomy,76 even 
though as “state-created and state-empowered entities,” local 
municipalities derive their existence and power from state 
governments.77  In today’s world of sprawling metropolitan 
landscapes, in which people often live and work in different localities, 
the only solution to stagnating inter-local competition is state 
interference.78  “Jurisdictional fragmentation has made the post-
modern metropolis far less governable than metropolitan regions 50 
years ago.”79  Highly exclusionary zoning and development policies 
                                                                                                                             
 71. See CALTHORPE & FULTON, supra note 20, at 10. 
 72. See Steinbrueck, supra note 25. 
 73. CALTHORPE & FULTON, supra note 20, at 6. 
 74. See DeWolf, supra note 51. 
 75. See Cashin, supra note 56, at 1993. 
 76. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: 
Part I]. 
 77. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 65, at 389. 
 78. See generally Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 55. 
 79. Stephen M. Wheeler, The New Regionalism: Key Characteristics of an 
Emerging Movement, 68 AM. PLAN. ASS’N J. 267, 271 (2002). 
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have emerged.80  Entrenched local powers have designed communities 
that limit social and political change.81  A less restrictive type of state 
interference in local autonomy, however, is the implementation of 
regional incentives to promote inter-local cooperation, known as 
“new regionalism.”  New regionalism responds to the failure of local 
government to resolve inter-local disputes, promote regional equity, 
and foster collaboration across borders.82 
Part I of this Note outlines new urbanism as a land use regime and 
explores reasons why it is such an important tool for twenty-first 
century planners.  Part I includes an examination of sprawl’s 
consequences and contemporary urbanization trends as well as the 
suggestion that new urbanism is a potential solution to these 
challenges.  Part II explores localism, including the theories of local 
governments’ power and its potential limitations.  Part II also 
connects the disadvantages of localism to the inadequacies of new 
urbanism’s implementation.  Part III argues that new regionalism 
provides the missing piece to the proper implementation of new 
urbanism.  Part III discusses the structure and key features of 
successful new regionalist regimes and explores current federal 
incentives for its implementation.  Finally, Part III analyzes the 
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commissions’ 1999 plan to 
address sprawl using new regionalism.  This Note concludes with a 
final discussion of localism as new urbanism’s greatest deterrent. 
I.  NEW URBANISM AS A LAND USE ARCHETYPE 
Part I details the concept of new urbanism, analyzes how new 
urbanist policies are deployed, outlines the various land use tools that 
planners have at their disposal, and examines sprawl and urbanization 
through the lens of new urbanism. 
Land use is a broad topic and encompasses various forms of 
planning and design.  New urbanism is one of many ways to 
implement a municipality’s land use vision.  The first section of Part I 
discusses the theory and principles of new urbanism and argues that 
new urbanist regimes will play a significant role in the resolution to 
sprawl in the next century. 
                                                                                                                             
 80. See Cashin, supra note 56, at 1993. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See generally Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan 
Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93 (2003). 
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A. The Principles of New Urbanism 
New urbanism is a practice in support of the following principles: 
[N]eighborhoods should be diverse in use and population; 
communities should be designed for the pedestrian and transit 
as well as the car; cities and towns should be shaped by 
physically defined and universally accessible public spaces and 
community institutions; urban places should be framed by 
architecture and landscape design that celebrate local history, 
climate, ecology, and building practice.83 
New urbanism attempts to manage development problems like 
sprawl using these principles.84  Additionally, the public process 
included in new urbanism helps break down the “isolation inherent in 
modern cities” and convey to those participating that “they’ve had a 
real voice in expressing their desires and concerns.”85 
New urbanism covers many different concepts of planning.  One 
expert has identified four types of design frameworks.86  The first and 
most common type is the traditional neighborhood development 
(TND).  This type aggregates regional architectural techniques and 
overlays them above a traditional town layout.87  TNDs utilize narrow 
streets that ensure safe passage for pedestrians.88  By focusing on 
pedestrian-friendly designs, new urbanist communities, like TNDs, 
attempt to limit reliance on the automobile, which helps reduce 
traffic, conserve energy, and improve air and water quality.89 
The second type of new urbanist community is the transit-oriented 
development,90 which emphasizes complex public transit in addition 
to pedestrianism.91  New urbanists under this approach make the 
transit systems “frequent and predictable . . . follow a route that is 
direct and logical . . . and have stops that are safe, dry, and 
dignified.”92 
                                                                                                                             
 83. Charter of the New Urbanism, supra note 39. 
 84. See Meredith, supra note 22, at 478. 
 85. Ray Gindroz, City Life and New Urbanism, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1419, 1428 
(2001). 
 86. See Brian Ohm & Robert Sitkowski, The Influence of New Urbanism on 
Local Ordinances: the Twilight of Zoning?, 35 URB. LAW. 783, 784 (2003). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See Lewyn, supra note 17, at 259. 
 89. See Meredith, supra note 22, at 480. 
 90. See Ohm & Sitkowski, supra note 86, at 784. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Meredith, supra note 22, at 481. 
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The third type of new urbanist community is the “hamlet.”93  
Hamlets are traditional “New England style” towns built around a 
common “green” and surrounded by closely spaced single-family 
homes.94  At the center of these neighborhoods, new urbanists add 
public civic spaces such as “government offices, post offices, libraries, 
and other community buildings.”95  These structures are built to 
encourage public interaction and evoke pride in communal 
participation.96 
The fourth type of new urbanist community is “infilling,” which 
focuses on the revitalization of existing towns.97  Infilling highlights 
the unique local attributes of existing communities in an attempt to 
recreate memorable and identifiable places.98  Infilling also seeks to 
integrate new technologies to make redevelopment compatible with 
the natural landscape and climate demands.99 
Scale is very important to new urbanism.  Planners utilize a variety 
of potential design scales.  In order of descending size, the scales are: 
1) the region, 2) the neighborhood, district, and corridor, and 3) the 
block, street, and building.100  Regions are “finite places with 
geographic boundaries derived from topography, watersheds, 
coastlines, farmlands, regional parks, and river basins” and include 
the metropolis, city, and town.101  New urbanist planners should 
regionally coordinate “economic development, pollution control, 
open-space preservation, housing, and transportation.”102  New 
urbanists find that the region is a critical economic unit that is 
fundamental to the modern world, and that new development should 
not realign existing borders.103  In other words, the physical layout of 
the region should not be redeveloped, and any new development 
should respect historic patterns and connect each neighborhood 
through a network of transportation alternatives.104  Regional new 
urbanists call for “deconcentration of poverty, urban growth 
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boundaries, tax-base sharing and balanced education systems.”105  At 
the regional level, new urbanists are concerned mostly with policy 
objectives.106 
The neighborhood, district, and corridor are “essential elements of 
development and redevelopment in the metropolis.”107  This level is 
chiefly concerned with urban planning doctrine.108  Neighborhoods 
should be “compact, pedestrian friendly, and mixed-use.”109  Districts 
should “emphasize a special single use.”110  Corridors should be 
“regional connectors of neighborhoods and districts and range from 
boulevards and rail lines to rivers and parkways.”111  This level 
includes the TNDs, transit-oriented developments, hamlets, and infills 
as discussed earlier in this Part.112  At this level of design, new 
urbanists have articulated more precise building principles to ensure 
fulfillment of their objectives.113 
The smallest scale of new urbanist concern consists of the block, 
street, and the building, where new urbanists attempt to “create 
community through designing public spaces that attract people.”114  
At this level of development, new urbanists predominantly focus on 
safety, comfort, and the interests of the pedestrian.115  They aim to 
meet these goals through specific design suggestions, such as “lighting 
at ample and regular intervals, landscaping that does not block 
[street] views at eye level, and windows that allow for surveillance of 
the street below.”116  They intend to encourage a “clear sense of 
location” and “reinforce community identity and the culture of 
democracy.”117  Ray Gindroz, a prominent new urbanist, suggests that 
“[f]ocusing design efforts on public spaces with human-scale 
sensibilities helps restore a sense of comfort to urban 
environments . . . and [makes] them hospitable places to live, work, 
and play.”118 
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New urbanism prioritizes diversity in both land use and socio-
economic composition.119  Diversity helps build community ties and 
limits the independence and subsequent isolation of individualism.120  
Employing mixed land use techniques allows planners to build self-
sufficient communities within walking distance of those who utilize 
them.121  Additionally, culturally diverse new urbanist communities 
promote “personal and civic bonds essential to an authentic 
community.”122  Ultimately, the designs attempt to provide an 
“attractive and safe environment” for the portion of the population 
who utilizes sidewalks through mixed uses, narrow streets, and 
reasonable distances between commercial areas.123  
B. Tools for Implementing New Urbanism 
To implement new urbanism, planners work within the established 
toolkit of local land use regimes.  In Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., the Supreme Court upheld the power of states to enact 
zoning codes.124  States then designated this power to municipalities 
through zoning enabling acts (ZEAs), which allow municipalities to 
engage in use and area zoning.125  Use zoning divides municipalities 
into various districts via use restrictions.126  Area zoning attempts to 
regulate the physical attributes of each lot via restrictions on size, 
heights of buildings, and set back requirements.127  Each ZEA 
generally requires a municipality to establish a “comprehensive plan” 
for application over the whole municipality.128  This comprehensive 
plan is then turned into a local zoning ordinance and a local planning 
commission generally prepares both documents.129  Any changes to 
the zoning ordinance are required to comply with the original 
comprehensive plan, and if those modifications are challenged, courts 
will search for justification within the comprehensive plan.130  Given 
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this regimented structure of zoning and the unlikelihood of a 
complete overhaul of a comprehensive plan, land use planners face 
limited options for zoning manipulation.131  Consequently, they are 
generally restricted to the use of three types of tools to modify any 
zoning ordinance: variances, special exceptions, and rezonings.132 
Variances are “permissions to deviate from the zoning law when 
application of the ordinance to a particular parcel would (1) impose 
an unnecessary hardship, and (2) the proposed use would not be 
contrary to the public interest.”133  Variances are granted for uses 
prohibited by the code but nonetheless allowed because of the 
consequences of restricting the variance.134  Generally, variances are 
used to relax area zoning—not use zoning—and apply only to a single 
parcel.135 
Special exceptions are usually articulated in the original zoning 
code, and allow complementary uses—such as schools, religious 
institutions, parks, or utility substations—to be built in otherwise 
restricted zones, as long as the exception has minimal negative impact 
for nearby homeowners.136  In certain instances, special exceptions 
include a provision for larger areas, which are called planned unit 
developments (PUD).137  Local planners work with developers to 
create a development that integrates mixed uses in a desirable way.138  
PUDs have recently become a very common way to circumvent 
traditional zoning regulations, and the Environmental Protection 
Agency estimates that upwards of forty percent of all residential 
development in the United States is approved under this system.139 
 It is also important to note that courts uphold challenges to 
special exceptions more frequently than challenges to variances.140  
Special exceptions are granted “as of right” with the theory of judicial 
deference being that the legislative body has predetermined this use 
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within the district as long as special conditions are met.141  Therefore, 
once those special conditions are met, land use boards lack discretion 
to deny the permits.142 
Lastly, rezonings or “map amendments” are actions taken to 
reorganize particular sections of a municipal plan at the request of 
developers.143  This type of action generally involves a “deal-making” 
strategy between the municipality and the developer because if the 
zoning is changed without cost, then the developer will receive a 
windfall, and the local government will miss out on an opportunity to 
extract value from the transaction.144  These deals most often create 
conditions on the rezoning.145  This process is called contract or 
conditional zoning, and the conditions may “involve anything from 
special limitations on uses, to specially tailored height or bulk 
restrictions, to requiring dedication of land to the city to widen 
abutting public streets.”146  Contract zoning has been challenged in 
court as “(1) unauthorized by the zoning enabling act; (2) inconsistent 
with the comprehensive plan; or (3) illegal preferential ‘spot 
zoning.’”147  Municipalities originally engaged in this process because 
traditional Euclidean principles proved too inflexible, but the current 
process does pose the danger of producing zoning decisions that are 
not in the public interest.148 
Two other potential rezoning tools are floating zones and overlay 
zones.149  Floating zones are predetermined zoning ordinances that 
include preexisting conditions and limitations, but are not specifically 
located.150  If a developer desires to take advantage of the “floating” 
zone, he applies for a permit to connect with a sector of land and then 
builds within the predetermined specifications.151  With an overlay 
zone, a unique use restriction is placed on top of part or all of an 
existing use area.152 
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Another alternative tool for integrating new urbanism’s principles 
is a relatively new type of zoning ordinance called the “smart code.”153  
The smart code was developed by Andres Duany and is meant to co-
exist as an overlay of an existing code.154  The smart code identifies “a 
continuum of rural to urban habitats varying in level and intensity of 
urban character,” and creates a zoning code reflecting the different 
categories.155  The smart code also “regulates the relationship between 
buildings, streets, and pedestrians,”156 and links “a building’s character 
by the urban intensity of its zone.”157  Rather than regulating the size 
of individual lots, the smart code adjusts density as a whole in each 
zone.158  Similarly, the smart code polices street width and block size 
through permissible size tables.159  Unfortunately, this code is meant 
to be suggestive for developers, and as a result, developers often fail 
to take advantage of it.160  Some advocate that it might be more 
effective if the code were mandatory.161 
C. Why Is New Urbanism an Important Planning Tool for the 
Twenty-First Century? 
New urbanism offers a direct remedy to some of sprawl’s 
downsides.  Most modern sprawling municipalities share six 
characteristics.162  First, sprawl is often low density; second, it consists 
of sporadic, “noncontiguous,” developed areas, which are separated 
by underdeveloped areas; third, land uses are segregated; fourth, it 
emerges in previously fragile agricultural lands; fifth, people in 
sprawling locations must rely on the automobile; and sixth, there is a 
lack of integrated land use planning across the sprawling area.163  
Additionally, sprawling areas cost more to maintain and service than 
do densely populated areas because they either expand the reach of 
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existing municipal services or create a need for new utilities that limit 
efficiency.164 
Opponents of suburban sprawl claim that it creates many victims.165  
They advocate that children, the elderly, and the middle class all 
suffer from sprawl’s reliance on the automobile.166  In sprawling 
communities children can only explore the nearest cul-de-sac, the 
elderly are mobile only if they have a driver’s license, and working 
America spends multiple hours a week stuck in commuter traffic.167  
Traffic is a particularly harmful side effect as it can cause economic, 
environmental, and social harm.168  According to the Texas 
Transportation Institute, traffic delays cost Americans nearly six 
billion gallons of fuel during the year 2000.169 
One study shows that certain types of suburbs limit social mobility 
and “kill the American Dream.”170  In particular, some metropolitan 
areas below the Mason-Dixon line have a direct correlation between 
metro area density and social mobility.171  Researchers found a 
relationship between this data and race.172  Larger African-American 
populations in low-density areas result in lower mobility.173  Poor 
minority populations have suffered disproportionately during sprawl’s 
expansion and the subsequent decline of the inner city.174 
Sprawl also limits a sense of local community.175  Through the 
physical separation of individuals along with economic and racial 
divisions, sprawl confines the ability of people to understand one 
another.176  Suburbs have little shared physical space where 
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individuals can interact with one another, and with even less forced 
interaction by way of proximity, they “retreat into the sanctuary of 
their family rooms.”177  This reality prevents both social and physical 
connections.178 
Finally, sprawl creates environmental victims beyond the 
displacement of undeveloped land.179  Indirect environmental effects 
include air and water pollution, increased energy consumption, and 
soil erosion.180  Intensive automobile use, a byproduct of the spatial 
expansion of sprawl, has been documented to negatively impact air 
and water quality.181  Also, of all the housing types, the predominant 
suburban single-family home consumes the greatest amount of 
energy.182 
As discussed in Part I.A, new urbanism is an attempt to reintegrate 
society by overlapping use districts, enhancing satisfaction through an 
increase in pedestrian safety, facilitating walkability, reducing the 
dependency on the automobile, creating a city center, and enhancing 
communal interaction by increasing public spaces.183  These goals 
directly relate to each of the victims of sprawl as outlined earlier in 
this section.  The hope is that through new urbanism’s diversification 
plans, a socially stratified community can coexist within the same 
space, thereby forcing interaction, and ultimately, understanding 
between the inhabitants.184  New urbanism designs acknowledge the 
downsides of sprawl and directly work to combat them.185  It is 
important that land use for the twenty-first century is utilized to build 
a cohesive society that can grow successfully into the future. 
D. Incentives for Implementing New Urbanism 
Some legislatures have created incentives in their state planning 
codes to encourage municipalities to implement new urbanism 
principles.186  These state incentives attempt to influence local 
governments to utilize their land use powers for new urbanism.187  In 
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2000, the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code was updated to 
promote smart growth.188  This “top-down” approach189 provides 
guidelines to the municipalities for “comprehensive plans, 
municipalities’ official maps, zoning ordinances, and other useful 
tools.”190  The purpose of this change in the code was to “highlight 
TNDs as a viable alternative to building suburban single-family 
houses on one-acre lots.”191  The 2000 amendments “provide enabling 
legislation for those local governments who choose to engage in 
sound land use practices.”192  This has provided a predictable 
foundation for local governments to plan and control land use 
policies.193 
Wisconsin is another example of preemptive measures used to 
promote TNDs.194  In 2001, Wisconsin “mandate[ed] that ‘every city 
and village with a population of at least 12,500 adopt a traditional 
neighborhood development ordinance by January 1, 2002.’”195 
This was an effort by the State to prevent municipalities from using 
conventional zoning and subdivision ordinances to discourage 
TNDs.196  The State, therefore, produced a model ordinance that 
towns and villages could replicate.197  Cities were given the option of 
treating the ordinance as a zoning district or as a modified approach 
to planned unit developments.198  Unfortunately, there was no penalty 
associated with failing to adopt the ordinance and by 2007 only about 
one third of Wisconsin cities had adopted the model.199 
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Although these incentive programs have encouraged some 
municipalities, new urbanism is still a fringe concept.  Attempts at 
implementation continue to stumble at the local level.  The next part 
of this Note explores the restraints that new urbanists encounter 
while working within the local governance. 
II.  LOCALISM 
This Part showcases localism as a theory of municipal autonomy.  
Discussion focuses on the arguments for localism as well as its pitfalls.  
It further traces the connections between localism and new urbanism 
and outlines how localism mutes some of new urbanism’s objectives. 
A. The Theory of Localism 
Local government is sometimes referred to as a “sanctuary for 
people,” meaning that actions taken by local governments have the 
greatest impact on people’s homes.200  Similarly, local government has 
the greatest potential to protect its citizens’ interests because local 
government is closest to the people it represents.201  The next sections 
detail the theory of localism and reproduce arguments for and against 
granting autonomy to local municipalities. 
1. Localism as an Autonomy Argument. 
Local governments are entities of the state.202  As the Supreme 
Court reasoned in Atkin v. Kansas, “[Local governments] are the 
creatures—mere political subdivisions—of the state, for the purpose 
of exercising a part of its powers.”203  They exist only by an act of the 
state, and as their creator, states enjoy complete authority to alter, 
expand, contract, or abolish any local government.204  Local 
governments have no rights against their state.205  Additionally, local 
governments act both as a delegate of the state, possessing only 
                                                                                                                             
The study examined thirty-two TND ordinances, of which only thirteen had adopted 
the model ordinance. See id. 
 200. See Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 65, at 383. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. at 386. 
 203. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220 (1903); see also JESSE J. RICHARDSON, JR. 
ET AL., IS HOME RULE THE ANSWER? CLARIFYING THE INFLUENCE OF DILLON’S RULE 
ON GROWTH MANAGEMENT (2003). 
 204. Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 76, at 7. 
 205. See id. 
1106 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
powers granted to them by their state, and as an agent of the state, 
exercising limited local powers on behalf of the state.206 
If states choose to delegate power to local governments, then the 
three sources of power that states utilize are state constitutions, 
legislation, and specific local charters.207  When determining the scope 
of local delegation, reviewing courts prioritize these possible methods 
of delegation.208  Generally, state constitutions receive the greatest 
deference, and if the authority is not found in the constitution, courts 
look next to legislation—both specific laws and municipal charters.209  
If the source of authority is still undetermined, courts then make their 
own determination, and this interpretation falls into two categories: 
strict and liberal.210 
Strict interpretation examines the direct language of the statute 
and begins with the assumption that there is no local authority unless 
clearly granted.211  This forms the basis of the statutory construction 
canon of Dillon’s Rule.212  Named for Judge John Dillon, an Iowa 
judge during the mid-nineteenth century,213  Dillon’s Rule, the most 
common method for determining the scope of local power,214 requires 
that all local powers must find their original basis in an express 
delegation by the state.215  “Under Dillon’s Rule, local governments 
may exercise only those powers ‘granted in express words,’ or ‘those 
necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to, the powers expressly 
granted,’ or ‘those essential to the declared objects and purposes of 
the [municipal] corporation—not simply convenient but 
indispensable.’”216  To prevent local governments from over-catering 
to special interests, the judiciary deploys this rule so that equitable 
services are distributed to the entire constituency of the 
municipality.217  Clayton Gillette calls Dillon’s Rule a weapon against 
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“fiscal overextension and its more vicious counterpart, municipal 
corruption.”218 
In contrast, a liberal construction examines legislation for specific 
language that restricts the grant of power and starts with the 
assumption that the authority is present unless expressly denied.219  
This interpretation is known as home rule.220  Home rule emerged as a 
reaction to the restrictive nature of Dillon’s Rule creating an 
insufficient amount of authority for local governments to deal with 
emerging issues.221  Some courts believe that local government 
contains an “inherent right of local self-governance.”222  Within home 
rule jurisdictions, local municipalities are almost treated as an 
“imperium in imperio, a state within a state.”223  A study of home rule 
decisions during its earliest implementation resulted in the conclusion 
that these courts generally permit “a fairly wide latitude of action on 
the part of the city in its so-called capacity as an organization for the 
satisfaction of local needs.”224 
On the surface it would seem that these two rules are 
contradictory, and although it is true that home rule has developed as 
a counter to Dillon’s Rule, the two rules are actually not mirror 
images and can coexist within the same jurisdiction.225  For instance, 
some jurisdictions may have different standards based on the type of 
municipality—utilizing home rule for counties, but Dillon’s Rule for 
towns or villages.226  Additionally, some municipalities in home rule 
states may have more restrictions than those in Dillon’s Rule 
jurisdictions.227 
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Critics of Dillon’s Rule argue that strict interpretation limits local 
governments from achieving their goals.228  Additionally, proponents 
of home rule suggest that the rule allows local governments to 
function and provide services efficiently and democratically.229  Even 
as home rule has broadened its influence, some commentators suggest 
that the existence of Dillon’s Rule within the zeitgeist of 
interpretation has limited local governments’ ability to capitalize on 
home rule flexibility.230  Regardless of the type of rule applied, 
fundamentally, both attempt to provide a structure of authority that 
ensures local governments properly supply necessary and desired 
services to their constituents.231 
The social economist Charles Tiebout promoted the public choice 
theory—sometimes referred to as “feet voting”—which posits that 
local citizens will choose a locality that provides their preferred 
services and products over localities that do not.232  For example, if a 
citizen is unhappy with the taxes and services of a particular locality, 
they will move.233  They are not just citizens but “consumer-voters.”234  
As a result, localities will attract individuals who most resemble the 
existing majority in that locality and dissuade those who do not agree 
with local policies.235  This behavior consequently facilitates 
preference homogeneity and justifies the proliferation of autonomous 
local governments as the most efficient way of providing state 
services.236 
Clayton Gillette writes that “[g]iven the assumption that the 
primary function of localities is to provide local goods and services for 
constituents, those ideal circumstances would [be obtained] when the 
package of local public goods and services provided in each locality 
satisfies the preferences of local residents.”237  This theory, coupled 
with Tiebout’s public choice concept, suggests that decentralizing 
power and providing for greater local autonomy through home rule 
serve a state’s best interest.  Any potential need for control over the 
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locality is balanced by the citizens’ ability to choose and create a 
competitive marketplace for different types of local governance.238 
Localism presents strong arguments for autonomy, and state law is 
generally accepting of the principle.  Empowering local government 
through a grant of autonomy is the underlying philosophy of 
localism.239  Once granted autonomy, local governments have the 
ability to make their own decisions in certain local areas.240  Localism 
creates a sense of deference for local autonomy regarding “matters of 
zoning, land use, property taxation, and the provision of public 
services.”241  With this autonomy, local governments command a great 
responsibility and have the ability to structure American society. 
2. Proponents of Localism Suggest Efficiency, Democratic, and 
Motivational Benefits 
Proponents of localism argue that it promotes “allocational 
efficiency in the provision of public services, democratic citizenship, 
and self-determination by territorial communities.”242  Briffault 
articulates three reasons behind the efficiency argument.  First, as 
mentioned in Part II.A.1, Tiebout’s public choice theory advocates 
that people are free to relocate, which results in greater efficiency for 
service distribution.243  The public choice theory also supports the idea 
that participation in local government is voluntary, and not coercive, 
which therefore gives it a more legitimate undertone.244  Second, given 
the uniqueness of local needs, it would be difficult to properly apply 
services if distributed at the state level.245  The centralized nature of 
state policymaking might overlook various local opinions and 
aggregate them under a single decision, thereby potentially excluding 
large amounts of people from receiving the benefits they desire.246  
Third, the availability of multiple localities provides for interlocal 
competition.247  Interlocal competition, and a fear of losing 
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constituents, motivates a resistance to local inefficiencies, particularly 
in areas of taxation, spending, and general policy administration.248 
Participation in the political process is critical for a strong 
democracy.249  Local governments provide a more manageable and 
easily accessible form of government.250  Within a smaller form of 
government, an individual’s voice is presumably stronger, and his 
ability to be heard and achieve meaningful results is therefore much 
greater.251  But this idea only works when local government is 
perceived to be autonomous, because people will not bother to 
participate if their local government has no real power over issues 
with which they are concerned.252 
Local autonomy creates a stronger sense of community because 
those participating in local government share concerns and values.253  
People have a unique connection to where they live, and the overlay 
of governance to this place creates a stronger bond for individuals.254  
Participation in an autonomous local system allows people to develop 
a community and create a historical identity that binds them to each 
other.255  Localism allows citizens to create a governmental structure 
within which they want to live.256 
Localists also argue that externalities can be better managed 
through a process of interlocal bargaining where multiple localities 
make accommodations and compromises with each other to create 
joint ventures or special-purpose districts.257  Economies of scale can 
be achieved through a joint program of providing services, and thus 
the inefficiencies of administrative and infrastructure costs can be 
eliminated, while negative externalities can be negotiated around and 
compensation measures can be set between localities.258  Essentially, 
autonomous localities have incentives to cooperate with their 
neighbors.259 
Although there seems to be many benefits to localism, the process 
can also have negative effects.  Opponents offer numerous strong 
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arguments that suggest localism may be restrictive and potentially 
detracting.260 
3. Localism’s Arguments Dissected for Flaws 
Proponents of localism argue that it provides for greater economic 
efficiency, political empowerment, and community education of civic 
life.261  But arguments for localism collapse when examining the 
regional consequences of local government action.262  Localism 
opponents argue that any marginal benefits of localism generated for 
local participants are outweighed by the collective harm at the greater 
region.263  In fact, as Briffault mentions, and this Note contends in 
Part III, these arguments suggest a need for a version of regional 
government, rather than local autonomy.264  Localism’s critics suggest 
that localism creates “isolated, self-interested entities that ignore or 
exploit the plight of their neighbors, particularly central cities.”265  
One reason for this exploitation might be what Cheryl Cashin labels 
as “the tyranny of the favored quarter.”266  Those with resources 
create externalities that are then shifted to those without resources.267  
Weaker neighbors are burdened by their more powerful neighbors’ 
ability to capture valuable assets and push out waste or unwelcome 
types of people and entities. 
As a result of the mobility of modern society and the ability to 
independently produce sufficient amounts of revenue,268 high-growth, 
developing suburbs further isolate themselves from the minority 
poor.269  If you cannot afford to live in the suburbs, then you cannot 
afford to work in the suburbs, much less absorb the costs of driving 
back and forth to the suburbs for employment each day.270  The less 
fortunate are left with no other option but to occupy the poverty 
ridden, inner city locations.271  William Julius Wilson comments that 
“[a]s the world of corporate employment has relocated to America’s 
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suburban communities . . . many of the residents of our inner-city 
ghettos have become physically isolated from places of 
employment . . . [and] the commute . . . becomes a Herculean 
effort.”272  Therefore, in contrast to suburbs, many inner cities are 
burdened with social and infrastructure externalities, which create 
greater economic demands on local resources.273  Inner cities are 
forced to provide a bigger safety net for their poor constituents while 
receiving less revenue from their tax base.274  These areas must, 
therefore, “look beyond the city limits to outside public and private 
actions,” to support their needs.275  Dependency on outsiders limits 
the cities’ autonomy and subjects them to state influence.276 
The reality of this dichotomy and fear of becoming responsible for 
these burdensome populations entrenches the isolation of smaller 
localities and creates intense interlocal political and economic 
conflicts.277  Due to localism’s legal prowess, local entities perpetuate 
economic advantages through exclusionary zoning systems or by 
providing incentives to attract commerce and boost tax bases.278  Lisa 
Alexander writes, “The decisions of a particular locality to exclude or 
include certain land uses, or to provide public subsidies for housing 
construction or economic development, will inevitably generate 
externalities or have spillover effects on neighboring localities.”279  
This competitive practice ensures that no locality is actually isolated 
because what happens in one area has a direct effect on its neighbors. 
The Tieboutian efficiency argument for localism is also challenged 
because it is premised on a world with no spillover effects, or 
externalities, between the localities.280  In reality, localities affect one 
another through policy decisions and actions.281  Pollution is a clear 
example of an externality that transcends the artificial borders of a 
municipality.282  In modern metropolitan areas, externalities are 
nearly guaranteed given the proximity of jurisdictional borders as well 
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as the overlapping routines of the citizens in different jurisdictions.283  
Briffault further elaborates, “As the example of sprawl indicates, 
[externalities] may not involve simply the impact of one particular 
locality on its neighbor, but may instead be the consequence of the 
aggregate of local policies across the region.”284  According to 
Briffault’s reasoning, the efficiency argument is best served through 
the lens of regional cooperation, rather than localism.285 
Additionally, the Tieboutian theory operates within a vacuum of 
cost and relies on the equal ability of each citizen to move between 
localities.286  But, not every participant is equally mobile, and exit 
costs may be prohibitive for certain classes of citizens.287  There are 
out of pocket costs associated with mobility, people can only live 
where they have access to employment, and people must be able to 
afford the costs of living in a locality.288  Poorer members of the 
community may have fewer options of mobility and, therefore, bear a 
disproportionate amount of the cost associated with this theory.289  
These inhibitors suggest that Tiebout’s theory is only applicable to 
the affluent.290 
Tiebout’s public choice theory also fails to consider interlocal 
inequalities, which further undermine localism’s democratic and 
community-based arguments.291  The theory assumes that the 
differences between localities are a product of taste rather than the 
result of external decisions that the locality has little control over.292  
A premise of the theory is that local governments have complete 
control over how they provide services, to whom they provide the 
services, and how much each service costs.293  In reality, localities 
make policy decisions based on their fiscal capacity to implement 
those decisions.294 
Another reason people may not move is because they are 
emotionally and sentimentally attached to their locality, despite their 
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disapproval of municipal policies.295  One’s community provides a 
stable environment filled with interpersonal support and physical 
security.296  Movement to another location would result in the loss of 
these benefits and the severing of sentimental attachments.297  
Uprooting this support structure has potential psychological costs that 
many people are unwilling to bear.298 
Effective democracy requires equal political voice.299  Proponents 
of localism argue that the nature of localism’s form generates greater 
democratic participation, but Briffault reasons that the inability of 
localities to actually address interlocal issues undermines this 
benefit.300  The political voice is muted by the fact that issues may 
have unsatisfactory resolutions in the local perspective.301  Briffault 
suggests that given the reality of an existence of inequality between 
localities, political powers concern themselves chiefly with expanding 
their tax base.302  This prioritization manifests as pandering to 
constituents with greater economic prowess—primarily corporations 
and the affluent—instead of small businesses and the poor.303  Finally, 
in the contemporary metropolitan area, where commuters spend 
significant time in multiple localities, the decisions of each locality are 
likely to neglect commuters’ concerns because they have no local 
voice in the political processes.304  Therefore, in the context of the 
metropolis, the argument concerning democratic benefits requires 
that there be a regional avenue to voice political concerns.305 
Localism’s community argument hinges on the fact that people 
share a single common space and live their daily lives interacting with 
one another.306  But in the metropolis people spend their days in many 
different locations and communities.307  Additionally, contemporary 
metropolitan areas lack a distinct city center as a gathering place for 
citizens.308  Harvard University Professor Gerald Frug explained that 
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city life is “the being together of strangers.”309  In contrast, localities 
emerging as a result of sprawling suburbs usually are communities of 
similar individuals, and, as a result, segregate communities based on 
social, economic, and racial stratifications.310  Homogeneity limits 
interactions with other types of people, and individuals retreat from 
forming diverse relationships.311  This system creates a cycle, as “[a] 
child growing up in such a homogenous environment is less likely to 
develop a sense of empathy for people from other walks of life and is 
ill prepared to live in a diverse society.”312  In other words, 
“fragmented local autonomy tends to encourage a highly parochial 
perspective among citizens.”313  Therefore, localism seems to create 
isolated communities weary of other people and other municipalities. 
B. Localism’s Connection to New Urbanism 
The failures of new urbanism can be associated with the pitfalls of 
localism that this Note discussed in Part II.A.3.  Local efforts to 
exclude low-income populations, competition between localities, the 
tyranny of the favored quarter, and isolationist tendencies are all 
disincentives for local governments to incorporate new urbanist 
principles in their land use plans.314  The next section of this Note 
explores many of new urbanism’s weaknesses and their symmetry 
with localism.  For instance, outskirt development and the high costs 
of housing in new urbanist communities create a mobility problem for 
populations lacking financial means and further isolates and 
homogenizes localities.315  Also, localism’s contempt of externalities 
discourages local governments from creating a regional system of 
corridors through which commerce and people could move and 
participate in new urbanist communities.316 
1. Local Land Use Autonomy Leads to a Void in Comprehensive 
Approaches 
One of the major impediments to new urbanism communities is 
that traditional zoning regulations are rigid and do not provide the 
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flexibility or scope for utilizing new urbanism’s design principles.317  
Deciphering a way to work within these restrictive systems demands 
creative thinking.318  Variances are too small of a tool given their 
typical use on individual lots.  Similarly, special exceptions help build 
one slice of new urbanism, but neglect the regional aspect of new 
urbanism. 
In the past, many new urbanist developments have utilized PUDs 
as their foundation.319  But new urbanist developers have struggled to 
use this tool to persuade local planning boards to deviate from 
“conventional standards of street width, lot size and type of dwelling 
permitted.”320  Therefore, locally adopted PUDs incorporate 
traditional zoning standards that are inconsistent with new urbanist 
principles.321 
Any zoning amendment must be consistent with the 
comprehensive plan.322  Thus, some communities have attempted to 
amend zoning ordinances to reflect new urbanist principles, but this 
too has faced difficulties.323  The flexibility of TND ordinances has left 
the window open for arbitrary interpretations by local zoning 
boards.324  New urbanist ordinances promote “good urban form,” and 
developers are consequently put off by the uncertainty of exactly 
what these ordinances allow.325  In the extreme, some cities have 
attempted to rewrite entire zoning ordinances, but even after a 
successful conversion, many preexisting uses exist and stifle wholesale 
conversions.326 
 Two categories of communities have attempted this approach: 
larger, older cities, and smaller, newer cities.327  Large cities, like 
Milwaukee, St. Paul, Chicago, and Denver, generally have codes that 
were rewritten in the 1950s to reflect the growth of suburbanization, 
and now they are rewriting their codes again to recapture the 
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fundamental character of the urban space.328  Smaller cities, on the 
other hand, are generally less defined, and their borders are still 
expanding.329  Smaller cities have recently redesigned their codes to 
shape new growth in the same vein as the old character.330  Two 
examples of this type of smaller city located near Charlotte, North 
Carolina include the City of Belmont (population near 9000) and the 
Town of Huntersville (population near 30,000).331 
Some critics believe that the failure of new urbanism lies in 
planners’ inability to create a policy framework that embraces all of 
its principles.332  The structures in which new urbanists work favor 
sprawl, and ordinances are used to regulate individual sites rather 
than whole places.333  New urbanists have meticulous requirements for 
the development of the neighborhood and block, but only vague 
guidelines for policy decisions at the regional level.334  Even improved 
smart code ordinances tend to focus on “a few development hot 
spots.”335  New urbanists have identified the need for a regionalist 
plan yet fail to deliver on the process.336  This may partially explain 
why the vision of new urbanism has failed in practice.337 
2. Municipal Self-Interest Disincentives Interlocal Bargaining 
The process of interlocal bargaining can assist new urbanism’s 
regional goal.  Interlocal bargains can provide a single public good to 
multiple localities by achieving economies of scale.338  Arrangements 
like municipal waste treatment plants or regional ambulatory services 
are examples of this type of bargain.339  Some interlocal bargains 
target socio-economic disparities, and, through burden sharing and 
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sacrifice, municipalities address issues like pollution control, 
redistributional zoning, and economic subsidies that attract 
business.340 
But many local governments, once involved in the process, may 
“have difficulty agreeing because they cannot readily verify each 
other’s expressed preferences over bargaining outcomes, they may be 
served by imperfect agents, they may face significant enforcement 
costs, and they may have difficulty agreeing on a division of the 
bargaining surplus.”341  Local governments can choose which projects 
they want to participate in, and if they see a greater downside than 
upside, they hide behind local boundaries.342  The self-interest 
byproduct of local autonomy may inhibit the process of interlocal 
bargaining, and thus restrict municipal cooperation around new 
urbanism. 
A concept that may explain the limitations of this type of 
cooperation is the “exploitation theory.”343  Exploitation theory 
suggests that “localities self-interestedly attempt to exploit each other 
in ways that foreclose volitional burden sharing.”344  For instance, one 
municipality may piggyback on the police presence provided by a 
neighboring municipality without paying any compensatory dues.345  
Others refer to this dilemma as a “free-riding” problem.346  Inner city 
governments invest in improvements to infrastructure to spur job 
growth and improve the quality of life for their residents, while 
wealthier suburban localities reap the rewards of these improvements 
without bearing any burdens.347  Similarly, inner cities tend to build 
regional assets, such as downtown shopping districts, museums, sports 
stadiums, parks, and hospitals, that subsequently transfer free 
spillover benefits beyond the city limits.348 
Another twist on this theory is Briffault’s prisoner’s dilemma 
explanation, called “limited rationality” of interlocal competition, 
where cooperation is stifled because localities’ inability to bind each 
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other around a deal inevitably leads to no deal being made.349  
Localities may have a strong incentive to wait out their neighbors and 
not expend resources on a particular service because another locality 
may have a greater need to provide that service.350  Once the service is 
provided, the original localities’ citizens can benefit from its creation 
without having contributed to its creation.  Conversely, if two 
localities have the opportunity to build a resource-generating asset, 
like a mall, rather than cooperating to share the costs, they will both 
build it to offset any potential losses incurred if the other location is 
built.351  Thus, localities will fail to make optimal decisions because 
their self-interest blinds them from seeing the benefits of 
cooperation.352 
Other critics point to the fact that regional promoters have neither 
a strong ability to influence local demand nor the ability to convince 
local legislatures to adopt regional policies.353  Consequently, public 
opposition to plans has stifled many local efforts because “[t]hey’re 
fearful of losing local character of cities and towns.”354  Local citizens 
are particularly skeptical of changes towards multi-family housing and 
smaller lots.355  Additionally, neighbors may challenge rezoning based 
on the concept of not in my backyard (NIMBY).356 
This xenophobic behavior has perpetuated other scenarios of 
imbalanced power.  For example, the “tyranny of the favored 
quarter” phenomenon is a percentage of the population that captures 
a disproportionate amount of public infrastructure resources through 
the use of overwhelming political influence.357  The favored quarter 
has three distinguishing characteristics.  First, it receives a greater-
than-proportionate amount of public infrastructure investments.358  
Second, it has the largest tax base and highest rate of job growth.359  
Third, it retains local powers and uses this power to isolate itself from 
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non-affluent regional workers.360  Cashin suggests that this social 
phenomenon is not a product of market forces but may instead be 
shaped by policy.361  The strong local power of areas comprising the 
favored quarter—the suburbs—allows decision makers to exclude 
certain undesirables and avoid accepting regional burdens.362  
Negotiating with the favored quarter for purposes of implementing 
new urbanism through policies of coordination and connection 
between municipalities may, therefore, be very difficult. 
Given the self-interested nature of local governance and the 
natural disincentives to work together, localities shun regional 
cooperation and participation in land use projects.363  This lack of 
cooperation stifles new urbanism’s first tier regionalism goals.364  
Local planners only have influence over local regulations, and their 
reach is restricted to within their borders.365  This limitation may 
restrict new urbanism planners from coordinating or integrating their 
designs with neighboring localities. 
3. Isolationist Tendencies Create a Patchwork of Suburban 
Implementation 
Critics suggest that most new urbanism development has occurred 
on the outskirts of metropolitan areas. As a result, those areas are 
quintessentially suburban,366 isolated from other developments, and 
dependent on the automobile.367  To date, new urbanism has “helped 
to produce more subdivisions than towns,” which lack integration 
with their surroundings.368  This reverses the natural progression from 
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dense urban development to less dense surrounding areas that new 
urbanists hope to capture in their designs.369  Since municipalities lack 
the political capital to demolish large areas for redevelopment, the 
only available space is on the undeveloped edges.370 
Some argue that infill projects should be prioritized before land on 
the edges is developed.371  Critics, however, claim that this process has 
actually resulted in scattered new development among older 
development and thus violates the very challenge new urbanism 
attempts to eliminate: segregation of uses.372  The patchwork result 
stifles normal, organic growth patterns and prevents the “fluid blend 
of multiple uses” that defines a successful urban landscape.373  The 
lesson is “to refrain from being seduced by the beauty contest that 
[n]ew [u]rbanists proclaim, and instead integrate all the key deeper 
social values such as safety, security, sacred places, and employment 
together.”374  This reality perpetuates the criticism that new urbanist 
developments are segregated into separate zones from existing urban 
places.375 
An example of this type of development is Orenco Station, 
Oregon, which is often referred to as one of the most promising 
examples of new urbanist development.376  This new urbanist 
community was planned and developed just thirty miles outside of 
Portland on land that was previously agricultural.377  The town 
commercial center was built about three blocks away from the train 
and on the main arterial road, giving the center a strong customer 
base of commuters.378  In Orenco, a study recently found that despite 
some opportunities for mass transit, residents still predominantly 
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relied on their “single-occupancy vehicles” for transportation.379  This 
type of choice for site development actually displaces more land and 
has indirect environmental effects.380  As one city councilwomen in a 
new urbanist community explained, “It’s so far out that everything 
you save on heating your house is going to be burned in your gas 
tank.”381 
Unfortunately, this tendency to develop new urbanist communities 
outside of the existing metropolitan limits can be traced to an 
underlying trait of localism.  The theory of municipal independence 
suggests that the original motivation for movement out of the 
metropolitan areas is rooted in a longing for a new, separate lifestyle.  
Thus, suburban residents no longer feel obligated or connected to 
residents of the central cities.382  Recent studies of the contemporary 
“full-service” suburbs, filled with corporate branches, local 
employment opportunities, and consumer mega hubs, suggest that 
residents residing in these areas have less need to travel into the cities 
for any of their daily needs.383  Further, once this system is in place, 
suburban residents may even feel empowered to compete and draw 
resources from the central cities to support their own labor and tax 
bases.384  Lisa Alexander explains that “local government law, 
therefore, normalizes and entrenches citizens’ private, market-based, 
racial, and economic preferences, which exacerbates spatial and social 
inequality.”385 
It seems that new urbanist communities may not actually be as 
integrated as their philosophy demands.  Celebration, Florida, a 5000-
acre compound designed by the Disney Corporation,386 and a well-
known example of new urbanist design,387 is touted as an example of 
how a new urbanist community should look.388  Unfortunately, this 
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community, as others like it, lacks the availability of jobs upon which 
a successful new urbanist community depends.389  “None of these 
communities have employment opportunities—jobs—down the street 
from the residences.  The dwellers of all these communities get in 
their cars and drive to their jobs off-campus.  New [u]rbanism thus 
becomes an after-6pm-and-weekend lifestyle choice, not a new way of 
life.”390 
 The independence of suburban municipalities is a hidden 
driver in new urbanism development.  An examination of the 
implementation of existing new urbanism communities displays this 
underlying bias of localism.  It is clear that even some of new 
urbanism’s most well regarded projects failed to address the suburban 
psychology of independence. 
4. Inequalities Between Municipalities Produce Exclusionary 
Regimes 
One major goal of new urbanism is the diversification of the 
community and the integration of multiple social classes within the 
project.391  Local government law generally creates inequalities 
between municipalities.  Allowing discrete local bodies to control 
“economically and socially interdependent territories . . . leads to 
fragmented local land use decisions, systemic exclusion, and 
distributional inequalities.”392  Local governments are structured to 
undervalue extralocal effects of their decisions because they do not 
feel the burdens, and without regional or state intervention, they will 
continue to neglect these externalities.393  As discussed in Part II.A.3, 
the “tyranny of the favored quarter,” displays how outer suburbs reap 
the benefits of development but “externalize development’s costs and 
burdens.”394 
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These interlocal inequalities are not a byproduct of choice by the 
local government but rather a byproduct of consequence.395  Briffault 
states that “economic localism prefers the interests of business and 
investors over those of individuals and families, those of the affluent 
over those of the poor and those of localities with healthy tax bases 
over those localities with limited fiscal capacity.”396  The preference to 
increase resources while limiting expenditures undermines both 
democratic participation and community by reducing local 
governments’ ability to create meaningful solutions.397   This system 
promotes interlocal competition and further reduces the ability of 
localities within a metropolitan area to recognize shared interests and 
build a community.398 
Local land use decisions showcase this power in action.  Through 
exclusionary practices, powerful localities use their local authority of 
zoning to protect the “quality” of residents.399  Additionally, zoning 
has been utilized to limit growth in affluent communities so social 
costs remain at a manageable level.400  Exclusionary zoning also has 
extralocal consequences by shifting burdens away from those 
localities implementing the policy and towards their neighbors.401 
Recently courts have begun to assess the regional implications of 
zoning practices.402  Many courts have rejected the view that the 
zoning decisions of municipalities should only be judged by their 
effect within the locality.403  Some opponents to this shift away from 
local autonomy argue that these cases deny localities “the ability to 
decide the future by themselves.”404  A few commentators have 
suggested that these cases represent a quiet shift towards greater 
oversight and invasion of traditionally local responsibilities.405  But the 
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level of state intrusion has been overly exaggerated.406  In fact, only 
four state supreme courts have examined exclusionary zoning 
practices, and only one, New Jersey,407 has required oversight by the 
state.408  Other state courts have scolded municipalities for taking 
exclusionary action, but without declaring their actions illegal per se, 
they have instead urged lower courts to examine the extralocal effects 
of policies as part of a balancing test to examine the legitimacy.409  
Courts have, however, continued to affirm decisions of local zoning 
boards as a result of a “desire to maintain the status quo within the 
community.”410 
5. High Property Prices and the Need to Increase the Tax Base 
Limits Diversity 
In Seaside, Florida, another new urbanism development, property 
prices originally reflected affordability at $17,000 per lot, but as the 
town grew in popularity the affluent moved in and consequently the 
price of lots rose twenty-five percent annually.411  These high housing 
costs have resulted in the exclusion of many minorities, creating a 
single homogenous enclave.412  There is a lack of “social diversity, 
affordable housing . . . [and] racial diversity” making Seaside a 
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“conventional suburban subdivision.”413  The ornamentation of new 
urbanist designs has also been criticized for increasing building costs, 
and thereby raising the eventual cost for future residents.414  Studies 
of the new urbanist community in Kentlands, Maryland reveal that 
future residents were willing to pay a twelve-percent premium for the 
new development.415  Left to market devices, these new developments 
will surely price lower income residents out while attracting only the 
affluent.416  It is a challenge for new urbanism to ensure availability of 
housing to all income groups.417 
While new urbanism has been accused of “making housing less, not 
more affordable,” it also faces criticism for having a deteriorating 
effect on existing social structures.418  Martha Lees explains, “Where 
advocates have attempted to build lower income housing on [n]ew 
[u]rbanist principles, they have done so in ways that raise the twin 
specters of gentrification and displacement.”419  The intentions of new 
urbanism are to integrate multiple classes of people together because 
mixing the wealthy and poor will have beneficial effects for both 
classes.420  Poverty deconcentration is intended to bridge the “social 
capital gap.”421  But studies have determined that these 
deconcentration programs fail to “take into account that poor people 
live in networks and that they are materially attached to their 
communities.”422  Rather, new urbanism has been dismissed as 
providing “only a façade of social improvement, promoting instead 
quaint architecture and a ‘yuppie infantalist fantasy’ for the upper-
middle class.”423 
New urbanist communities are rooted in middle class suburban 
assumptions.424  Consequently, plans actually reduce the amount of 
available housing by eliminating super-dense high-rise buildings to 
accommodate for multi-family townhouses.425  Reducing the density 
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of the development creates a problem of overflow.426  Lower income 
residents are inconvenienced and displaced to other areas.427  This 
displacement creates a new problem in which poorer people have 
difficulty finding housing outside of the “poorest, racially segregated 
communities.”428  The displacement has the reverse effect of 
reconcentrating poverty within a smaller location than originally 
existed, resulting in these populations lacking the support network 
upon which they previously relied.429  New urbanist efforts to improve 
diversity in inner city neighborhoods must be cautious not to upset 
the existing social fabric.430 
The segregation of new urbanist communities has also limited 
lower income residents from accessing these new developments.431  
“New [u]rbanism has largely failed to live up to its own goals for 
diversity, and attracts mostly white, affluent residents.”432 
Additionally, the distance from the inner city prevents low-income 
residents from reaching the new development areas and taking 
advantage of potential jobs there.433  The unavailability of new 
urbanist development is also criticized as part of the concept’s failure 
to cure segregation.434 
Deterring social mobility of lower income populations creates a 
weaker tax base for those areas where the poor congregate.  Differing 
local needs determine the fiscal ability of a municipality to deal with 
its responsibilities.435  Cities with older, poorer, and more crowded 
populations demand more resources than newer, smaller, more 
affluent developments.436  Communities with larger tax bases have 
more purchasing power to handle these needs and vice versa.437 
An example of this discrepancy is reflected in a series of school 
finance cases where poorer communities must be taxed at higher rates 
to provide a substandard product compared with communities with 
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higher tax bases.438  One such example is Robinson v. Cahill, where 
the New Jersey Supreme Court examined school finance reform in a 
home rule jurisdiction and determined that a system of allowing the 
locality to fund schooling through local taxation would violate the 
state constitution if not supplemented by state sources.439  The local 
taxation system had led to great disparities in school funding between 
localities.440  The court explained, “How much will be done by local 
government may, of course, depend upon the size of its tax base, 
which, as to local government, is substantially the value of its real 
property.”441  Disparities, therefore, are a recognized byproduct of 
local autonomy.442 
Localism’s spatial separation has led to a sense of “private 
ownership over public services and the local tax base,” which 
undermines interests in protecting the less fortunate.443  New urbanists 
favor market-based solutions, and as such may compromise regional 
solutions.444  Eschewing administratively based solutions, new 
urbanists want to encourage ways of promoting cooperative 
agreements within the existing system while retaining profit 
motives.445  But traditional market-based solutions have resulted in 
conditions to which new urbanists would object, including 
“superblocks, low interconnectivity, dendritic street systems, and 
automobile dependence.”446  The market has delivered vehicles that 
serve to further segregate populations and isolate new urbanist 
communities from the region. 
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III.  NEW REGIONALISM AND NEW URBANISM WORKING 
TOGETHER 
Part III fills some of the gaps previously detailed in Part II that 
localism creates for new urbanism’s success.  Part III focuses on the 
potential for regional plans that incentivize interlocal cooperation and 
build communities that are not only integrated but move forward 
together as a cohesive unit. 
Martha Lees wrote that “the average American has ties to any 
number of locations in addition to those in which she currently 
resides, including the places she used to live, the place she works, the 
places she shops, and the place she vacations, among others.”447  
Regardless of the precise reason, new urbanism has failed to achieve 
its goal of creating an integrated regional plan, and as a result, its 
communities have, at best, been implemented sporadically across the 
American landscape.448  This has been described as “[n]ew [u]rbanist 
islands in a sea of sprawl.”449  To achieve total success, new urbanism 
must realize the need to connect to the broader region and become 
part of a cohesive plan.450  This change might help address some of the 
social, economic, and environmental concerns that new urbanism’s 
critics discuss.451 
A regionalist approach is the only true way to combat the pitfalls of 
localism and allow new urbanist communities to fully develop.  The 
promotion of new urbanism must be accomplished by the 
coordination of many actors, and overcoming localism’s drag on 
cooperation can only be achieved by sidestepping localist tendencies 
altogether.  This Note does not promote political consolidation of 
localities into a single regional entity, but it argues for strong 
incentives around regional cooperation—otherwise known as “new 
regionalism.”  Part III identifies new regionalism, discusses its 
weaknesses and strengths, and explores a few localism challenges to 
the deployment of new regionalism.  Finally, it links new regionalism 
to new urbanism and offers possible resolutions to some of new 
urbanism’s weaknesses. 
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A. New Regionalism Defined as an Interlocal Cooperation 
New regionalism has been defined as “any attempt to develop 
regional governance structures or interlocal cooperative agreements 
that better distribute regional benefits and burdens.”452  New 
regionalists attempt to restrict local governments from pursuing local 
interests and, if possible, shift some authority away from them.453  
New regionalism is a response to local governments’ failures to “(1) 
resolve cross-border, multi-issue challenges[,] (2) promote regional 
equity amongst interdependent localities[,] and (3) foster 
participation and collaboration across local boundaries.”454  Some 
would argue, however, that, given the contemporary metropolitan 
design of our society, new regionalism is the logical next step to 
localism.455 
There are several types of interlocal cooperation on the regional 
level.456  At the most formal levels, cooperation becomes separate 
government, or consolidation, and at an informal level, it is a series of 
interlocal agreements, or cooperation.457  Policy proposals do not 
require the creation of institutions and can be achieved through 
private groups or individuals working together within local borders or 
from collections of individuals working across local borders.458  
Cooperation is favored, as it allows local governments to retain local 
identity and control.459  Regional cooperative approaches have been 
used, among other objectives, to manage gentrification,460 as well as in 
the reduction of greenhouse gases.461 
New regionalism’s greatest benefit is its direct response to failures 
in local law.  As metropolitan areas have grown, interdependence of 
municipalities within these areas has also grown.  This 
interdependence has had a secondary effect of increasing cross-
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border consequences of actions taken within each municipality.462  
The collective well-being of the region has been neglected by 
localism’s aggregate spillover effect.463  Regional regulation may be 
the only way to resolve problems associated with this cross-border 
spoliation.464 
There are many benefits to cooperative regionalism, including 
efficiency, equity, and responsiveness.465  There are 22,000 local 
governments that have less than 2500 inhabitants.466  Cooperation 
permits local governments to obtain economies of scale by pooling 
their buying power without losing local autonomy.467  By obtaining 
economies of scale, each local government can devote more resources 
to other priorities, which thereby increases their efficiency.468  Sharing 
responsibilities and burdens leads to greater equity among localities, 
and some studies even suggest that communities with greater poverty 
are more likely to cooperate.469  Burdens are shared through subsidies 
from one locality to another in order to offset inequality.470 
Cooperation generally occurs around projects of intense capital 
investment, such as “roads, sewers, water supply, waste disposal, and 
fire-fighting equipment,” which increases the entire region’s general 
well-being.471  Finally, municipalities that cooperate with one another 
have higher rates of monitoring, professional management capacity, 
and political voice, which increase the overall responsiveness of the 
local government.472  If a municipality is willing to work with other 
municipalities, it is generally substantially more responsive to the 
needs of its own citizens as well as its partners. 
B. The Obstacles to New Regionalism 
On the other hand, new regionalism faces many hurdles.  One 
major challenge to new regionalism is the uphill battle supporters will 
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face against “self-interest.”473  Local officials, land developers, 
corporations, and residents from high tax base localities most often 
represent the segment of the population acting with self-interest.474  
Matthew Parlow articulates this sentiment as he explains that 
“affluent localities would likely view contributing their tax dollars to 
address regional concerns, like poverty in the central city, as taking 
money from them without gaining any benefit in return.”475  These 
powerful constituents have previously led a successful effort to 
combat regional cooperation, and some earlier regionalists accepted a 
level of futility when seeking consolidated governments.476  Therefore, 
the “fate of regionalism will turn on whether regionalists will be able 
to persuade people that their interests are sufficiently tied in with 
those of the residents or other communities within the region.”477 
Overcoming stakeholder collaboration dilemmas that arise in a 
system of participation between unequal groups presents another 
potential hurdle to new regionalism.478  These dilemmas can be 
separated into two groups: representative dilemmas and power 
dilemmas.479  Representative dilemmas include: (1) demographic 
representation, where proper representation is sacrificed for the 
symbolism of a traditionally marginalized group having 
representation; (2) representative opportunism, when a 
representative forsakes the interests of her constituents for her own 
self-interest; and (3) representative acquiescence, when a 
representative unknowingly consents to a dominant narrative which 
ultimately disempowers her constituents.480  Power dilemmas include: 
(1) the exercise of power, where a power stakeholder dominates a 
weaker one; (2) the exclusion of power, when powerful stakeholders 
suppress certain reform goals; and (3) the acquiescence of power, 
when the dominant stakeholder uses narratives and psychological 
processes to manipulate the weaker.481 
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Both types of dilemma lead to a problem of regulatory capture that 
must be addressed.482  For example, poor communities might “find 
their limited tax base exploited to finance improvements that 
primarily benefit better-off citizens.”483  Accountability measures are 
necessary to overcome some of the consequences of these 
dilemmas.484  Some new regionalists suggest that maximized 
participation and direct, transparent monitoring are two potential 
safeguards against capture.485  Others suggest local constitutional 
changes that may include “nested” provisions.486  By providing a 
broad set of rules that define alternatives for organizing and 
operating the cooperation of local governance, these provisions create 
a foundation for local governments to take advantage of regional 
cooperation’s benefits.487 
It has been suggested that the single greatest contributor to 
regional cooperation is the presence of regional leadership.488  
Regional leadership can come in many different forms, including 
federal programs,489 state oversight,490 or simply leaders from within 
the region.491  Each of these leaders recognizes either that localism has 
failed to address some obvious concerns or that attempting to address 
these same concerns individually is ineffective.492 
Utilizing a network of agencies and programs, the federal 
government can be far reaching.493  Proponents argue that federal 
programs can ensure that investment is likely to produce regional 
returns.494  In particular, the federal government is well suited to 
address issues of transportation, environmental policy, credit 
financing for housing, and the revitalization of communities.495  An 
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example of this type of federal involvement is the Obama 
Administration’s Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant 
Program (the Grant Program), which was developed by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to 
incentivize regional cooperation through grant funding.496  To receive 
funding, the program requires voluntary “commitment to broad 
multijurisdictional stakeholder participation . . . [the development of] 
comprehensive solutions to interrelated problems . . . [and 
obligations] . . . to conduct effective and informed monitoring.”497  
The program was specifically designed to help localities overcome 
deficiencies in their own legal structures.498 
Similarly, states can incentivize local governments to cooperate 
regionally by providing “carrots or sticks.”499  For example, the state 
can promise a “carrot” of additional funds on any regional plans.500  
Conversely, the “stick” approach might require compliance with 
regionalist ideals prior to receiving state funding.501  Additionally, 
states can help set predictable rules for regional cooperation, thus 
infusing stability to the process.502  As detailed in Part I.D, 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin are both examples of state-led attempts 
to incentivize locality compliance with new urbanism’s principles.503 
Lastly, while leadership comes in many forms on the local level, 
each form generally displays three common characteristics.504  First, 
the leaders represent a “convener” with the power to facilitate 
integration of the stakeholders.505  Second, these leaders are action-
oriented, and through their passion for “doing,” they establish 
performance measures against objectives.506  Finally, these leaders 
display qualities of longevity and responsiveness to change that help 
perpetuate cooperation in the long term.507 
Whatever the source, there is a consensus that some sort of 
leadership is necessary for successful cooperation.508  Determining the 
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proper level of leadership—whether federal, state, or local—along 
with determining the best regional structure can make or break the 
endeavor.  Striking a balance between the needs of local autonomy 
and the needs of regional oversight is critically important to a 
successful regional plan. 
C. Filling the Gaps of New Urbanism by Overlaying New 
Regionalism 
A major benefit of regional cooperation is the reduction of 
competitive consequences resulting from the phenomenon of mobile 
citizens.509  As mentioned in Part II.A.1, Tiebout theorizes that people 
are mobile-consumers and will move to localities that present them 
with a desirable environment.510  If local differences are reduced 
through the application of regional cooperation, then Tiebout’s 
mobile citizens will settle down.511  Less mobility will reduce interlocal 
competition around attracting these citizens, and thereby decrease 
disincentives to cooperate as well as minimize the socio-economic, 
racial, and ethnic segregation that occurs.512  Both the regional 
cooperation and diversity that might occur would have direct links to 
new urbanism’s objectives and potential success.513  For example, if 
minority populations are viewed less as burdens to be shifted and 
more as the normal fabric of each community, then exclusionary 
zoning practices and concerns about increasing tax bases should fade.  
Localities might look to encourage diversity in their tax base to satisfy 
constituents’ desires to have an eclectic community, rather than be 
concerned about economic detractors. 
New regionalism will also encourage political collaboration across 
borders, which would directly satisfy new urbanism’s need to plan 
regional streams of commerce.514  A flaw of localism is its capacity to 
blind local municipalities from seeing “how other more equitable 
possibilities are in the region’s collective self-interest.”515  Regional 
cooperation offers new “territorial, regulatory, and political 
frameworks” for local governing bodies to discuss possible benefits 
                                                                                                                             
 509. See Nestor Davidson & Sheila Foster, The Mobility Case for Regionalism, 47 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 63, 67 (2013). 
 510. See Gillette, supra note 217, at 968. 
 511. See Davidson & Foster, supra note 509, at 75–76. 
 512. See id. at 74. 
 513. See supra Part I. 
 514. See supra Part I. 
 515. Alexander, supra note 279, at 640. 
1136 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
and resolve problems of self-interest.516  Localities within a region 
“tend to rise and fall together,”517 and new urbanism’s incorporation 
of mixed uses and commerce requires negotiations between 
neighboring localities to survive.518 
It is important to find the proper form of regional cooperation, 
depending on the activity that needs to be conducted.519  In terms of 
new urbanism, planners look to regional cooperation to provide 
decisions with authoritarian weight that can help quell the localities’ 
concerns with competition, as explained in Part II.A.2.520  Scott A. 
Bollens has described some possibilities for regional approaches: 
functionally specific regional agencies,521 federally inspired regional 
agencies,522 regional councils of government,523 public-private 
alliances,524 regionalism through state oversight/regulation,525 and 
comprehensive metropolitan government.526  New urbanism would 
require a balance that provides some state oversight yet preserves 
local autonomy.  The ideal type of regional framework would 
encourage localities to initiate the development of new urbanist 
communities without causing them to fear the loss of their 
independence.  It would also provide a platform for localities to meet 
and coordinate regional designs.  Additionally, new urbanism could 
benefit from public-private alliances that help bring commerce to the 
city centers and ensure a healthy flow of economic traffic. 
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Yet another approach categorizes three phases of regional 
cooperation.527  The first phase “stresse[s] structural solutions such as 
city-county consolidations, while the second phase focuse[s] on 
procedural reforms designed to improve program coordination and 
comprehensive planning.”528  The third phase is “led by coalitions of 
interest groups which are often cross-sectoral . . . focus on areas of 
substantive strategic concern . . . and . . . employ facilitated processes 
to develop a shared vision.”529  One commonality shared by each of 
these categories is the importance of state facilitation, whereby states 
set rules and shape the context for cooperation.530 
D. Regional Cooperation Proves Successful in the Delaware 
Valley 
One successful example of regional cooperation is the Delaware 
Valley Regional Planning Commission (DVRPC).  Formed in 1967, 
the DVRPC is an interstate attempt by Pennsylvania and New Jersey 
to service the greater Philadelphia metropolitan area.531  The DVRPC 
has addressed regional issues through reports on transportation, food 
systems, and smart growth.532  This Section will focus on the DVRPC’s 
report, New Regionalism: Building Livable Communities Across the 
Delaware Valley.533 
The purpose of the report is to explain key strategies and provide 
detailed guidance for the development of well-planned 
communities.534  Recognizing the risk of new urbanist communities 
being inappropriately built as fringe communities, the report seeks to 
address this pitfall through well-reasoned plans.535  The DVRPC 
attempts to encourage development to take advantage of existing 
infrastructure and avoid disruption of sensitive rural areas.536  The 
plan discusses all of the major tenets of new urbanism, such as land 
use planning, building specifics, transportation alternatives, social 
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integration, infill development, and environmental consequences.537  
Most importantly, the plan articulates regional strategies that it 
recognizes as critical to prevent local efforts from becoming 
overwhelmed.538  Simultaneously, the report prepares arguments for 
why these strategies are best for individual localities, and thus 
confronts the problem of self-interest that regional plans often face.539 
The DVRPC is an example of new regionalism at its best.  The 
DVRPC was developed using state authority, but does not trample on 
local autonomy.  The reports that the DVRPC issues are suggestive 
and not mandatory, yet they persuade localities by examining the 
problems from their perspective.  The DVRPC has had success 
utilizing this strategy, and as a result, the greater Philadelphia 
metropolitan area has been able to maintain logical and sustainable 
development.540  For example, Chester County has created a 
comprehensive plan that ninety-three percent of its municipalities 
have agreed upon.541  Additionally, West Philadelphia now has safer 
and cleaner streets and is proving to be a more attractive district to 
residents and business.542  In Lower Merion Township, the policies 
have reduced vacancies on Main Street and created a more diverse 
mix of businesses.543  Finally, access to public transit has reduced 
traffic across the region, and those increases in access are most 
notable in the City of Chester and King of Prussia.544  The DVRPC 
has prioritized listening to the communities’ needs, which has resulted 
in individualized solutions that are successfully growing the entire 
region.545 
CONCLUSION 
Americans are increasingly living in areas classified as 
“metropolitan.”  The development patterns that parallel this 
migration have led to sprawling communities.  These communities 
have demanded local autonomy to make their own economic, 
political, social, and environmental decisions.  Unfortunately, local 
autonomy, also known as localism, has had negative repercussions on 
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the metropolitan area.  Given some of the concerns regarding 
localism’s externality-shifting, the tyranny of the favored quarter, and 
social inequalities, land use planners have looked to alternatives for 
new development to combat the effects of sprawl. 
New urbanism has emerged as a viable alternative for planners.  
New urbanist communities encourage pedestrian-friendly city centers 
that integrate mixed uses and promote diverse communities.  
Arguably, these changes raise the standard of living.  Unfortunately, 
new urbanism’s success depends on regional implementation, which 
has been stunted by localism’s natural self-interest and isolation. 
To combat the limitations of new urbanism, new regionalist 
solutions are powerful tools that localities can employ.  Encouraging 
incentives for cooperation between stakeholders seems to be a logical 
strategy for new urbanism implementation.  Incentives can come from 
many sources of leadership, such as federal, state, or local actors.  
Importantly though, new regionalist solutions must balance the need 
for local autonomy and the requirement that localities recognize their 
interdependence.  New urbanism’s fate relies on regional programs 
and their ability to create cooperation.  Thomas Jefferson might have 
dreamt of an agrarian republic in which each landowner was self-
sufficient, but he would probably agree that a unified, sustainable 
society in which landowners share in a cooperative experience is 
acceptable.  New urbanism provides a potential vehicle for some of 
America’s growing challenges.  Since Jefferson was, above all else, a 
believer in a healthy Republic, we might even say that his 
contemporary dreams would be filled with mixed uses, narrow streets, 
and diverse sets of pedestrians walking to work and sitting on front 
stoops. 
